Uniform Commercial Code Survey: Sales by Rowley, Keith A. et al.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2005
Uniform Commercial Code Survey: Sales
Keith A. Rowley
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Carolyn L. Dessin
Larry T. Garvin
Robyn L. Meadows
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law. For more information, please contact
david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rowley, Keith A.; Dessin, Carolyn L.; Garvin, Larry T.; and Meadows, Robyn L., "Uniform Commercial Code Survey: Sales" (2005).
Scholarly Works. Paper 548.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/548
Sales
By Robyn L. Meadows, Keith A. Rowley, Larry T Garvin, and Carolyn L. Dessin*
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 2
Last year's survey noted a trend among courts treating the sale of prepackaged
software primarily as a sale of goods but the sale of custom software primarily as
a contract for services.' In Mortgage Plus, Inc. v. DocMagic, Inc. ,2 the court put a
bit of a gloss on that trend, holding that an agreement consisting of both a software
license and ongoing document preparation services was predominantly a contract
for services governed by common law because the software was "worthless with-
out the actual loan preparation services."3
In Lohman v. Wagner,4 the court concluded that a contract to raise and sell
weaner pigs was a contract for the sale of goods, despite the services involved in
tending the pregnant sows during gestation, helping birth, and caring for the
newborn piglets until they were ready for delivery to a buyer. The court reasoned
that "those services were all incidental to the eventual delivery of the specified
pigs and did not constitute the main thrust or predominant purpose of the agree-
ment" which was "the purchase and sale of young pigs."-
CONTRACT FORMATION
In Bio-Tech Pharmacal, Inc. v. International Business Connections, LLC,6 Bio-Tech,
a manufacturer of nutritional supplements, purchased raw materials from IBC
approximately seventeen times over a four-month period beginning in September
1999. Typically, the parties would discuss availability and price over the telephone.
* Robyn L. Meadows is Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania and an editor of the U.C.C. Survey Keith A. Rowley is Professor of Law at the William
S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas, and co-chair of the Sale of Goods Subcom-
mittee. Larry T. Garvin is Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.
Carolyn L. Dessin is Associate Professor at the University of Akron School of Law. Professor Garvin
wishes to thank Robin Lyden for her able research assistance.
1. See Robyn L. Meadows, Carolyn L. Dessin & Larry T. Garvin, Uniform Commercial Code Survey:
Sales, 59 Bus. LAw. 1557, 1558 (2004).
2. 55 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 58 (D. Kan. 2004).
3. Id. at 61-62.
4. 862 A.2d 1042, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1057 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), cert. denied,
869 A.2d 865 (Md. 2005).
5. Id. at 1047-48, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 1064. Both unborn and young pigs are Article
2 "goods." See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) & cmt. 1 (2001).
6. 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 476 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004).
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If they reached an agreement, Bio-Tech would issue a purchase order to IBC,
which in turn would purchase the desired materials from its own supplier. Once
IBC received the materials from its supplier, it would send Bio-Tech an invoice
that referenced Bio-Tech's purchase order. Bio-Tech would confirm its receipt of
IBC's invoice by telephone. IBC would ship and Bio-Tech would receive and pay
for the invoiced materials "without protest or complaint. '" 7
The parties' relationship began to break down in early 2000 when Bio-Tech
attempted to cancel several orders by writing "CANCEL" across copies of purchase
orders previously sent and faxing them to IBC. IBC eventually sued Bio-Tech for
the unpaid balances due on three of these purchase orders. Bio-Tech denied lia-
bility, arguing that there was no contract because its purchase orders were offers
that IBC could accept only by faxing or e-mailing a confirmation, which it had
not done. The trial court found for IBC. The court of appeals affirmed, noting
that, while purchase orders generally constitute offers, the ones here might well
be either acceptances of a telephonic offer or confirmations of an oral agreement
reached on the phone.8 Even if they were offers, under section 2-206 such offers
invite acceptance in any manner and by any reasonable medium; thus, IBC was
not restricted to accepting the offers by faxed or e-mailed confirmation.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In Propulsion Technologies, Inc. v. Attwood Corp.,9 PowerTech purchased propeller
castings from Attwood, which PowerTech used to manufacture boat propellers for
sale to third parties. After Attwood notified PowerTech that it was terminating
their supply agreement with less notice than the parties' letter agreement required,
PowerTech sued. Attwood defended on the ground that the contract was unen-
forceable under section 2-201.10 The district court concluded that the agreement
was primarily for the purchase of Attwood's services, rather than for goods, and
thus the statute of frauds did not apply It entered judgment in PowerTech's favor
based on the jury's finding that Attwood had breached.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that, because specially-manufactured goods
are expressly included in the definition of "goods" in section 2-105," contracts
for the sale of specially-manufactured goods are, as a matter of law, transactions
in goods within the scope of Article 2, notwithstanding the labor and expertise
involved in designing and fabricating an item that "is custom designed for the
buyer's needs and is not readily marketable to others." 12 It then held that the letter
agreement between the parties failed to satisfy section 2-201 because it neither
stated a specific quantity nor substituted PowerTech's requirements for a specific
7. Id. at 477.
8. See id. at 479-80.
9. 369 E3d 896, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 466 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying Texas law).
10. See Appellant-Cross-Appellee's Opening Brief in Propulsion Technologies, Inc. v. Attwood Corp.,
369 E3d 896, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 466 (5th Cir. 2004), available at 2003 WL 23917174.
11. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2001).
12. Propulsion Technologies, 369 E3d at 901, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv 2d (West) at 469.
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quantity term.1 3 Inexplicably, the court completely overlooked the specially-
manufactured goods exception in section 2-201(3)(a). 4
Lohman v. Wagner, discussed above, also involved a statute of frauds defense.
The only writing in the case indicated that the seller (Lohman) would "supply
approximately __ weaner pigs weekly" to the buyer (Wagner).' 5 The trial court
refused to enforce the purported agreement because it did not contain a quantity
term. On appeal, Lohman argued that the quantity term requirement in section
2-201(1) is intended only to limit enforcement to the extent of the quantity stated,
not to bar enforcement in its absence and, alternatively, that the parties' agreement
was an output contract, exempt from stating a specific quantity The appellate
court rejected both arguments and held that the alleged agreement was unen-
forceable.'
6
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
In Todd Heller, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Transportation,'7 Heller contracted
to supply INDOT with glass beads for use in reflective traffic paint. The contract
required the beads to conform to AASHTO M 247-81, an industry standard for
moisture resistance and adhesion. Prior to delivery, Heller tested the beads, using
an industry-standard testing procedure, to confirm that they conformed to M 247-
81. Following receipt, INDOT tested the beads using a different procedure and
rejected several batches. Heller retested the rejected beads and found that all of
the rejected batches conformed. When Heller demonstrated the industry-standard
procedure to INDOT's senior chemist, the beads again conformed. Independent
testing by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("Penn DOT") con-
firmed Heller's results. Nevertheless, INDOT cancelled its agreement with Heller,
citing the repeated failure of Heller's beads to pass INDOT's testing. Heller sued
INDOT for breach of contract and lost at trial. Heller appealed.
A majority of the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the terms of parties'
agreement could be explained or supplemented by usage of trade.' 8 Therefore,
despite contractual language requiring Heller to be familiar with INDOT's sam-
pling, testing, and reporting methods, 9 the majority held that Heller had used
an industry-standard testing method and that "the existence of a usage of trade
in the glass beads industry dictating how the test is to be performed trump[ed]
INDOT's 'discretionary' interpretation of the test method."20 Therefore, the trial
court erred in concluding that there was no relevant trade usage and that INDOT
was free to test Heller's beads by whatever method it chose.
13. Id. at 904-05, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 468, 473.
14. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a) (2001).
15. See Lohman, 862 A.2d at 1045, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 1060.
16. Id. at 1048-49, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 1065-67.
17. 819 N.E.2d 140, 55 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
18. Id. at 146, 55 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 471 (citing IND. CODE §§ 26-1-2-105(1) & -202).
19. See id. at 141-42, 55 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 465.
20. Id. at 148 n.3, 55 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 473 n.3.
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In dissent, Judge Vaidik focused on the language in the Heller-INDOT agree-
ment requiring Heller to "be familiar with INDOT's testing methods." She con-
strued this language to trump the trade usage on which Heller and the majority
relied. 21 While the majority opinion does not address Judge Vaidik's conclusion,
it might not be irreconcilable with the majority's opinion. The express terms of
the contract required Heller to "be familiar with" INDOT's testing methods, not
to follow or satisfy INDOT's testing methods. Indeed, one could easily argue that
Heller made a good faith effort to educate INDOT on how to perform the tests
and that INDOT's refusal to accept the results of Heller's industry-standard testing
was contrary to INDOT's duty to perform its contract with Heller in good faith.
In 1990, the parties in RGJ Associates, Inc. v. Stainsafe, Inc.22 entered into a letter
agreement whereby Stainsafe would purchase from Williamsville all of the fur-
niture care products Stainsafe needed for the domestic retail market. In 1998,
Stainsafe decided to produce its own leather furniture care products and so in-
formed Williamsville, which continued supplying Stainsafe with wood, fabric, and
lacquer furniture care products until May 2001, when Stainsafe ceased paying for
products. Williamsville then withheld further shipments and Stainsafe filed suit. 23
Finding that the letter agreement was only partially integrated, 24 the trial court
allowed extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' course of performance and any
relevant trade usages to explain or supplement the terms of the written agree-
ment-most particularly, the scope of Stainsafe's obligation to promote Williams-
ville's "product line." In doing so, the court correctly ruled that "[a] sale contract
need not be ambiguous for the admission of evidence of course of dealing, course
of performance, or usage of trade. 25
BATTLE OF THE FORMS
Courts continue to encounter-and, at times, struggle with-section 2-207.
For example, in Montgomery Rubber & Gasket Co. v. Belmont Machinery Co. ,26
Belmont orally offered to sell a boring mill to Montgomery for $29,500. This price
included having Belmont rewire the machine and allowing Montgomery to inspect
it before Belmont shipped it to Montgomery. Montgomery orally replied that it
would pay Belmont $25,000 for the boring mill, would forego preshipment in-
21. See id. at 150 (citing IND. CODE § 26-1-1-205(4)) (Vaidik, J., dissenting) (The editors of the
Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service did not publish Judge Vaidik's dissent.).
22. 338 F Supp. 2d 215 (D. Mass. 2004).
23. See id. at 226-32.
24. See id. at 244-45.
25. Id. at 243; see also U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1(c) (2001) ("This section definitely rejects ... [tihe
requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified in par-
agraph (a) is an original determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous.").
Not every court grasps that U.C.C. § 2-202 does not require a court to inquire whether the written
agreement is ambiguous, much less find ambiguity, before considering the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence. See, e.g., Benedict Mfg. Co. v. Aeroquip Corp-, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 888, 891
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam) (describing "whether contract language is clear or ambiguous" as
"the threshold issue" in interpreting a sales contract (emphasis added)). The RGJ Associates court clearly
got this point right.
26. 308 E Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D.. Ala. 2004).
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spection, and would either wire the machine itself or make arrangements for a
third party to do so. Belmont then faxed Montgomery a confirmation of Mont-
gomery's terms, and Montgomery tendered payment to the party Belmont des-
ignated. 27 The district court rightly concluded that a contract existed between
Belmont and Montgomery. However, rather than finding that the parties reached
an oral agreement that Belmont confirmed with its fax, or that Belmont's fax
accepted Montgomery's oral counteroffer, the court, ignoring the language of sec-
tion 2-207(1), ruled that Belmont's fax was a counteroffer-despite the fact that
it did not contain any language expressly conditioning its effect on Montgomery's
acquiescence to any additional or different terms contained therein nor did it
contain any additional or different terms.2 8
WARRANTIES AND DISCLAIMERS
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
In a case of first impression, the New York Supreme Court held that a restaurant
patron could maintain an action for breach of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability 29 for injuries sustained when a complimentary glass of water served with
a meal allegedly broke in the customer's hand. 30 The restaurant moved for sum-
mary judgment arguing the restaurant was not in the business of selling water or
glasses. The court denied the restaurant's motion, reasoning that although the
water was provided free of charge, it was an indispensable part of the meal, the
cost of which was presumably built into customers' bills, and thus a sale of the
water had occurred. 31 On the issue of whether the warranty extended to the glass,
the court, relying on two similar cases from other jurisdictions, 32 ruled that, if the
glass in which the water was served was defective, then the water was not ade-
quately contained or packaged as required for a good to be merchantable. 33
27. See id. at 1295, 1300.
28. See id. at 1300. The court reasoned that, while Belmont's fax contained essentially the same
terms Montgomery proposed, "the content of the fa[xl demonstrates that it was intended to be a
counteroffer, not an acceptance. The document is entitled 'proposal,' refers to the terms as a 'quote,'
and states that the machine 'is offered subject to prior sale.'" Id. at 1300 n. 11.
29. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2001) (providing that "Itihe serving for value of food or drink to be
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere" gives rise to the implied warranty).
30. Gunning ex rel. Gunning v. Small Feast Caterers, Inc., 777 N.Y.S.2d 268, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (West) 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
31. Id. at 271, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 504.
32. See Levondosky v. Marina Associates, 731 E Supp. 1210, 1213, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Cal-
laghan) 487 (D.NJ. 1990) (holding casino that served complimentary drink to gambling patron could
be liable for breach of implied warranty of merchantability when patron swallowed glass chips from
rim of glass because gambling by patron was value given for drink and drink and container must be
fit for ordinary purpose); Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 588 Pl2d 233, 234-35, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 427 (Wash. 1978) (holding that a wine glass that broke when served to a customer made
the wine not adequately contained or packaged, and thus not merchantable).
33. See Gunning, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 271, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 504; see also U.C.C. § 2-
314(2)(e) (2001) ("Goods to be merchantable must be ... adequately contained, packaged, and
labeled as the agreement may require . ").
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In Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 34 the Eleventh Circuit held that
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) 35 did not preempt a
smoker's estate's claim that cigarettes were not fit for their ordinary purpose and,
therefore, not merchantable under Article 2. The district court granted the ciga-
rette manufacturer's motion to dismiss all claims and the estate appealed. On the
issue of the breach of the implied warranty, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
Alabama Supreme Court, in answer to the court's earlier certified question, opined
that the estate could state a valid claim that the cigarettes breached the implied
warranty of merchantability by alleging cigarettes were not fit for the ordinary
purpose for which they were used.36 Because a determination as to breach of the
warranty of merchantability is "fact-intensive," and the record contained no evi-
dence that the cigarettes smoked by the deceased were fit, the district court erred
in dismissing the merchantability claim. Moreover, the court ruled that the FCLAA
did not preempt the estate's merchantability claims because the implied warranty
does not impose any duty or obligation on the manufacturer "with respect to
advertising or promotion" as required by the FCLAA. The legal duty imposed by
the warranty is to not market unsafe products, not to wam that one is doing so.37
In an interesting case involving the proper method for disclaiming implied
warranties, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a car dealer had validly dis-
claimed all implied warranties. In Wilson v. Royal Motor Sales, Inc. ,38 the court
addressed whether a disclaimer on the back of a purchase agreement was con-
spicuous. For a year and a half, the car purchased by the plaintiff from the de-
fendant dealer had many problems. Finally, the buyer stopped driving the car,
notified the dealer she was revoking her acceptance of the car, and then filed suit
alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The trial court granted
the dealer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the dealer had dis-
claimed the warranty On appeal, the buyer argued that the window sticker on
the car at the time of purchase did not indicate the car was being sold "As Is,"
merely that it was being sold with a factory warranty However, the purchase
agreement she signed indicated that she had read the back of the agreement. The
back of the agreement included the following: "THIS VEHICLE IS SOLD 'AS IS-
NOT EXPRESSLY WARRANTED OR GUARANTEED' AND THE SELLER HEREBY
DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." 39 Addition-
ally, the purchase agreement provided, in all capital letters, that all warranties
were the manufacturer's or supplier's and not the dealer's and that only the man-
ufacturer or supplier would be liable for the warranties and not the dealer. The
appellate court concluded that language on the back of a written agreement is
34. 363 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Alabama law).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
36. Spain, 363 E3d at 1198 (citing Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 872 So. 2d 101,
50 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1091 (Ala. 2003)).
37. Id. at 1199.
38. 812 N.E.2d 133, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 473 (Ind.'Ct. App. 2004).
39. Id. at 134, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 474.
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conspicuous if it is printed in a conspicuous manner, such as in bold or capitalized
text larger than the surrounding text. 40 It then concluded that the language used
in this case did not conflict with the language on the window sticker and satisfied
the requirements of section 2-316(2). 4 1
EXPRESS WARRANTIES
In Sharp v. Tamko Roofing Products, Inc. ,42 the court considered whether claims
made in advertising created express warranties. Plaintiffs owned homes on which
the defendant manufacturer's shingles had been used. The homeowners alleged
the shingles did not seal properly and therefore blew off of roofs and were subject
to cracking, curling, excessive deterioration, and premature aging. The home-
owners sued for breach of express and implied warranties in addition to other
common law and statutory claims. The shingles came with a manufacturer's ex-
press limited warranty of twenty-five or thirty years, depending on the type of
shingles used, through which the manufacturer would pay only a prorated amount
for the shingles, based on the shingles' age. The plaintiffs' express warranty claim
was not based on this limited warranty, but on statements made in the product
brochures and advertisements, such as "proven to last a long, long time," "long
lasting," "years of maintenance free protection," and "durable: ' 43 Although general
statements such as these seem more properly regarded as classic puffery than as
something that rises to the level of a warranty,- the court did no more than suggest
this, instead relying on the fact the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that
the plaintiffs relied on the statements in purchasing the shingles. 45 The court held
that, to prove breach of an express warranty, there must be evidence that "the sale
would not have been made but for the representations." 46 The court equated the
"basis of the bargain" requirement in section 2-313(1)(a) with reliance, 47 a ques-
tionable determination given the official comments to section 2-313, 48but perhaps
40. Id. at 137, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 476-77 (discussing the definition of "conspicuous"
in Indiana's version of pre-revised U.C.C. § 1-201(10)).
41. See id. at 137-39, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 477-79.
42. 55 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 226 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004).
43. Id. at 228.
44. For a case finding statements such as "premium quality," "a masterpiece," and "ready to take
you thundering down the road" constituted classic advertising puffery and therefore could not be the
basis of a deceptive trade practices claim, see Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W2d 233,
246, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 721, 735 (Wis. 2004).
45. See Sharp, 55 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 228-29.
46. Id. at 229.
47. See id.
48. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (2001) (noting "no particular reliance" on statements made during the
bargain need be shown and any fact that takes statements out of the agreement requires "clear affir-
mative proof"); see also, e.g., Felley v. Singleton, 705 N.E.2d 930, 934, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West)
586, 591 (IIl. Ct. App. 1999) ("[R]epresentations by the seller such as the car 'is in good mechanical
condition' are presumed to ... become part of the basis of the bargain .... unless the seller shows
by clear affirmative proof that the representations did not become part of the basis of the bargain.").
But see, e.g., Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 461 N.W2d 55, 61, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 990, 999 (Neb. 1990) ("Since an express warranty must have been 'made part of the basis
of the bargain,' it is essential that the plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty." (quoting Wendt v.
Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, 366 N.W2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1985))).
HeinOnline -- 60 Bus. Law 1645 2004-2005
1646 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 60, August 2005
justified in this case given there was no evidence the consumer plaintiffs had ever
seen the brochures or advertising.
PRIVITY
In several cases, courts considered whether Article 2 warranties protected per-
sons other than the immediate buyer. In Fortune View Condominium Ass'n v. Fortune
Star Development Co.,49 a general contractor sued the manufacturer of an allegedly
defective siding system used by the contractor in a condominium project. The
general contractor asserted a breach of warranty claim based on express warranties
created by statements-in the manufacturer's brochures. These brochures contained
information on the physical properties of the siding system, including test results
for water penetration and resistance. The brochures also indicated that the siding
was designed for use in the residential and light commercial markets and included
a five-year limited warranty The contractor was shown the brochures by the
distributor of the siding systems, who sold the system to the siding subcontractor.
By affidavit, the general contractor testified that it relied on the brochures when
submitting its bid for the condominium project. Based on these warranties, the
general contractor sought indemnity from the siding manufacturer and the sub-
contractor for any liability it may have to the condominium association or devel-
oper for damages caused by defects in the siding. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the siding manufacturer and the subcontractor. Affirming
the court of appeals' reversal of the summary judgment in favor of the manufac-
turer, the Washington Supreme Court noted that, unlike implied warranties, ex-
press warranties created by advertising do not require privity of contract.50 A
majority of the court ruled that the general contractor's claim for implied indem-
nity based on the manufacturer's express warranties, likewise, did not require
privity of contract.51
In Inter Impex S.A.E. v. Comtrade Corp.,52 a federal district court ruled that New
York law requires privity of contract in cases which do not involve personal injury.
It therefore dismissed claims against a manufacturer for breach of express and
implied warranties for improper packaging. Finding the manufacturer was not a
party to the sales agreement and had made no warranties directly to the buyer,
the court held the buyer could not recover damages for economic loss arising
from breach of warranty 53
49. 90 P.3d 1062, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 792 (Wash. 2004).
50. See id. at 1064 n.3, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 795 n.3. The Washington Supreme Court
did not decide whether the manufacturer's brochures contained express warranties. See id. at 1064,
53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 794-95.
51. See id. at 1065-66, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 796-97.
52. No. 00 Civ. 0133 (GBD), 2004 WL 2793213 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2004).
53. See id., 2004 WL 2793213, at **4-5.
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CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
There were several interesting cases this year on acceptance, rejection, and
revocation. In Dan J. Sheehan Co. v Ceramic Technics, Ltd. , 54 Sheehan ordered
$178,532.32 worth of tiles from Ceramic, which Ceramic shipped to Sheehan,
and Sheehan promptly installed in a shopping mall food court. Despite installing
all of the tiles it ordered from Ceramic, Sheehan paid Ceramic only $124,532.32.
When Ceramic sued for the unpaid balance of $54,000, Sheehan answered that
some of the tiles were nonconforming. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Ceramic and Sheehan appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that (1) Sheehan failed to timely notify Ceramic of any allegedly nonconforming
tiles;55 and (2) Sheehan accepted the allegedly nonconforming tiles by installing
them in the food court, an act inconsistent with Ceramic's continued ownership
of the tiles.56
In Montgomery Rubber & Gasket Co. v. Belmont Machinery Co., discussed above,5 7
the district court denied the seller's (Belmont) motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the buyer (Montgomery) had accepted the boring Till under
section 2-606(1)(b) by failing to timely reject, finding that (1) the timeliness of a
buyer's rejection is generally a matter for the trier of fact; (2) a factual dispute
existed regarding whether and how often Montgomery complained to Belmont
about the boring mill's failure to perform before Montgomery attempted to reject;
and (3) even if the court were to take as true Belmont's allegations that Montgom-
ery did not complain for at least 90 days after receipt, "[blecause the boring mill
required complicated assembly and new wiring, 90 days may have been required
to give Montgomery ... a reasonable time to inspect."5 8
In H.A.S. of Fort Smith, LLC v. J.V Manufacturing, Inc., 59 J.V sold H.A.S. a linear
press brake system and agreed to install it on November 10-12, 2000. J.V did
not actually begin installation until December 18, and was unable, over the next
three weeks, to make the system work. On January 5, 2001, H.A.S. terminated
the agreement and reinstalled the old system. Thereafter, H.A.S. asked J.V to
refund its down payment and to reimburse it for out-of-pocket costs incurred
during J.V's failed attempt to install the new system. When J.V refused to pay,
H.A.S. sued and prevailed in a bench trial. The Arkansas Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding that H.A.S. had properly revoked its acceptance of J.V's press
brake system after J.V's efforts to cure6° the problems with the press brake system
proved unsuccessful. The only real question for the appellate court was whether
H.A.S., despite the obvious substantial impairment, had waited too long after
54. 605 S.E.2d 375, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, (Jan.
10, 2005).
55. Id. at 377, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 525-26.
56. See id. at 378, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 526; see also U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(c) (2001) (any
act inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the goods constitutes an acceptance of the goods).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
58. Montgomery Rubber, 308 F Supp. 2d at 1301.
59. 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1007 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004).
60. Id. at 1015.
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acceptance to revoke. 6 ' The court held that three weeks was not too long under
the circumstances.
62
In Campbell v. Ag Finder Iowa Nebraska,63 Campbell contracted to sell his 1997
crop of "human food quality" organic soybeans "EO.B. farm" to Ag Finder, which
in turn contracted to resell Campbell's soybeans to Manna. Ag Finder took deliv-
ery of Campbell's soybeans and tendered them to Manna, which had them trans-
ported out of state. Upon receipt, Manna rejected the soybeans, because they were
not "human food quality," and shipped them back to Ag Finder. When Ag Finder
resold the soybeans for use as feed, and paid Campbell based on their value as
feed, less Ag Finder's expenses incurred following Manna's rejection, Campbell
sued for breach. Campbell prevailed in a bench trial, despite having tendered
nonconforming soybeans, because the trial court found that Ag Finder accepted
the soybeans without first testing them to see whether they were "human food
quality" and failed to revoke its acceptance on grounds permitted by section 2-
608. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that: (1) absent an effective
rejection, Ag Finder must be deemed to have accepted Campbell's nonconforming
soybeans; 64 and (2) because Ag Finder could have easily discovered the noncon-
formity before accepting the soybeans and did not fail to reject them due to any
assurances by Campbell, Ag Finder could not revoke its acceptance.
65
In Smith v. Monaco Coach Corp.,66 the buyers of a Monaco motor home sought
to revoke their acceptance after noticing a number of defects in the motor home
that Monaco's authorized dealers were unable to repair. Recognizing a split of
authority, the Smith court chose to follow Kutzler v. Thor Industries, Inc. ,67 which
in turn followed the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Gasque v. Mooers Motor
Car Co.,6 in holding that section 2-608 does not permit a buyer to revoke ac-
ceptance against a manufacturer that did not sell directly to the buyer.69 Of course,
61. See U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (2001) ("Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change
in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer
notifies the seller of it.").
62. H.A.S. of Fort Smith, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 1014-15. Although the time period at
issue here was much shorter, this case is reminiscent of North American Lighting, Inc. v. Hopkins Manu-
facturing Corp., 37 E3d 1253, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1061 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying
Illinois law). There, the court allowed the buyer to revoke acceptance nearly two years after the buyer
purchased the seller's headlight aiming system-despite knowing that there were problems with the
seller's prototype and despite using the system while the seller and some of the buyer's employees
collaborated to try to resolve the unacceptably high error rate-because the buyer balked at revoking
acceptance earlier due to the seller's continued assurances and apparent good faith efforts to cure. The
buyer revoked acceptance only after it became clear that the system's flaws were incurable.
63. 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 235 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004).
64. Id. at 238-40.
65. Id. at 240-41.
66. 334 E Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
67. 51 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 141 (N.D. II. 2003).
68. 313 S.E.2d 384, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 120 (Va. 1984).
69. See Smith, 334 F Supp. 2d at 1070. But see, e.g., Larry J. Soldinger Assocs., Ltd. v. Aston Martin
Lagonda of N. Am. Inc., No. 97 C 7792, 1999 WL 756174 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1999); Durfee v. Rod
Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W2d 349, 357, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 945, 957-58 (Minn.
1977) (en banc); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. y. Novak, 418 So. 2d 801, 804, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1150, 1154 (Miss. 1982); Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 433 A.2d 801,811-12, 32 U.C.C.
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a buyer may also lose the ability to revoke acceptance because of specific language
in or incorporated into the sales contract effectively disclaiming warranties and
prohibiting the buyer from returning the goods to the seller for any reason (at
least in Michigan). 70
Finally, a number of cases decided in 2004 turned on the timeliness of an
injured party's notice to the seller or manufacturer of nonconforming goods".7
BREACH OF CONTRACT
In Indeck Energy Services, Inc. v. NRG Energy, Inc.,72 Indeck ordered three gen-
erator step-up transformers-used to change the voltage of electricity supplied
by an electrical generator so that the generator may be connected to an electrical
grid 73-from Waukesha, to be used at a power plant Indeck was developing and
would later sell to NRG. Waukesha acknowledged Indeck's purchase order. After
Indeck made the required 10% progress payment, Waukesha manufactured and
shipped the transformers according to Indeck's instructions (and, eventually, re-
shipped them to another location at Indeck's instruction), and issued invoices to
Indeck for the balance due. Indeck refused to pay and sued seeking a declaration
that it was not liable for any unpaid sums because Waukesha had previously
breached their contract by refusing to agree to allow Indeck to assign all of its
rights and liabilities to NRG's subsidiary. Waukesha counterclaimed to recover
the balance due plus re-shipping, handling, and storage costs incurred because
neither Indeck nor anyone else had accepted the transformers, and moved for
summary judgment.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 57, 70-71 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc., 572
A.2d 921, 923, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 870, 874-75 (Vt. 1990) (all allowing buyers to
revoke against manufacturers based on manufacturers' express warranties).
70. See, e.g., Parsley v. Monaco Coach Corp., 327 F Supp. 2d 797, 803, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(West) 301, 306-07 (WD. Mich. 2004); Ducharme v. A & S RV Ctr., Inc., 321 E Supp. 2d 843,855-
56 (E.D. Mich. 2004), aff'd, 127 Fed. Appx. 204 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
71. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Daimler Chrysler, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 226, 228-29
(N.D. Il. 2004) (barring a breach of express warranty claim because the buyers failed to allege either
that they satisfied the notice requirement of U.C.C. § 2-607 or that they were excused from doing so
because the seller had actual knowledge of the defect or because the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries
as a result of the defect); Carfaro v. Emergency Svcs. Holding, Inc., 782 N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004) (sellers entitled to judgment as a matter of law because buyer "first notified them that the
products were defective more than 16 months after discovery of the alleged defect and that the
notification was thus untimely as a matter of law"), leave to appeal dismissed, 824 N.E. 2d 52 (N.Y.
2004); see also, e.g., Zeigler v. Sony Corp. of Am., 849 A.2d 19, 24 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (opining,
in dicta, that a buyer that seeks to sue a manufacturer for breach of implied warranty must give the
manufacturer the notice U.C.C. § 2-607(3) requires, that the "plaintiff, as well as the other class
members, is required to give individualized notice ... not simply ... of a defect--of which the
defendants may already be aware-but notice of this plaintiff's claim the alleged defects constituted
a breach of warranty," and that "the plaintiff's argument that 'generalized' knowledge satisfies the
requirement of notice is ... contrary to the plain language of this state's law and seriously undermines
the U.C.C. policy of avoiding lawsuits by encouraging negotiation and promoting timely cure of defects
by sellers and manufacturers").
72. 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 990 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
73. Id. at 992.
HeinOnline -- 60 Bus. Law 1649 2004-2005
1650 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 60, August 2005
The district court granted Waukesha's motion for summary judgment, holding
that (1) Indeck and Waukesha had a valid contract, based both on their exchange
of forms and each party's performance; (2) Waukesha discharged all of its obli-
gations under the contract by timely designing, manufacturing, and shipping (and
then re-shipping) conforming transformers as instructed by Indeck; and (3) In-
deck materially breached the contract when it refused to pay the balance due.
74
The district court found no merit to Indeck's claims that Waukesha breached the
contract by refusing to agree to allow Indeck to assign all of its rights and liabilities
to a subsidiary of NRG that was, at the relevant time, a shell company established
by Indeck for tax purposes. Indeck's contract with Waukesha provided that nei-
ther party could assign its contractual rights and duties without the other party's
prior written consent, but that such consent would "not be unreasonably with-
held."75 The district court found that Waukesha did not unreasonably withhold
its consent when, after investigating the creditworthiness of the proposed assignee,
Waukesha was unwilling to agree to transfer the liability for more than $3,000,000
to a "shell company" with no credit history and for which Indeck refused to act
as surety 76 Moreover, even if Waukesha had unreasonably withheld its consent,
the court ruled that Indeck had waived any such breach by not asserting it until
after Waukesha sought to recover the balance due.
7 7
In RGJ Associates, Inc. v. Stainsafe, Inc. , discussed previously,78 the court found
that one party's material breach of an exclusive dealing contract gave the non-
breaching party (Williamsville) "the choice of either continuing the contract or
suing for breach."7 9 Because Williamsville continued to sell its products to the
breaching party (Stainsafe)-all but those that Stainsafe had wrongfully refused
to purchase-the court concluded that the contract survived the breach and both
parties remained bound to it.8 0 In the alternative, the court ruled that the parties
agreed to modify the preexisting contract to exclude the product line that Stainsafe
had chosen to produce for itself.8'
REMEDIES
SELLER'S REMEDIES
In a sparse group of damages discussions, one stands out. In Honeywell Inter-
national, Inc. v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. ,82 the court dealt with the collapse
74. See 2004 WL 2095554, at *8-9 (the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service did not publish
parts I and II of the opinion-hence, the citation to the Westlaw version in this and the following
footnotes).
75. Id. at *9.
76. See id. at * 10.
77. Id. at *9.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
79. RGJ Associates, 338 E Supp. 2d at 226.
80. See id. at 226-27.
81. See id. at 227. Because the Williamsville-Stainsafe contract was for the sale of goods, U.C.C.
§ 2-209(1) would require no additional consideration to make a modification binding. See U.C.C.
§ 2-209(1) (2001); RGJ Associates, 338 E Supp. 2d at 227 & n.26.
82. 858 A.2d 392, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 541 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
and remanded, 872 A.2d 944 (Del. 2005).
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of a strategic alliance between Honeywell and Air Products. Pursuant to the par-
ties' deal, Air Products purchased its requirements of certain chemicals used in
manufacturing semiconductors from Honeywell. Air Products agreed to use rea-
sonable efforts to promote the sale of Honeywell's chemicals to its customers and
also agreed not to enter into other strategic alliances or similar arrangements with
other manufacturers of the chemicals. Honeywell, however, was not so tightly
limited. It could enter into similar arrangements with Air Products' rivals, but
only if the strategic alliance failed to meet its sales targets. Both parties had the
right to terminate the agreement upon two years' notice if various targets were
not met. From the start, the alliance failed to meet its goals and Honeywell con-
tinued to sell a great deal of chemicals outside the alliance. The fractious rela-
tionship ended when Air Products bought the electronic chemicals division of
Ashland, one of Honeywell's rivals. Honeywell thereupon gave notice of termi-
nation and sued, though Air Products and Honeywell continued to do business
for some time after. Air Products likewise gave notice of termination.8 3
The chancery court held that Air Products breached the agreement to purchase
its requirements for chemicals from Honeywell when it acquired the competing
portion of Ashland. Honeywell sought lost profits for the sales it would have
made had Air Products purchased all its needs for chemicals from Honeywell. But
this, the court held, was far too broad, for it included the sales that Air Products
made solely because of its purchase of Ashland. Adverting to New York common-
law decisions on consequential damages and causation, the court ruled that these
profits were not fairly within the parties' contemplation when they entered into
their alliance, so Honeywell could not recover them.8 4 Allowing damages for cus-
tomers previously served by the alliance was entirely proper, the court concluded,
but not those who had not been served before.85
There are so few opinions that calculate damages for breach of a requirements
contract that this is worth some attention, and the recent rise of strategic alliances
makes the opinion all the more timely The result is not unsound, though it is
not reached ideally It seems correct to award damages based on lost profits here,
because Honeywell essentially complained of lost volume. The court's task was,
thus, to calculate the sales Honeywell lost due to Air Products' breach. In doing
so, the chancellor properly excluded sales attributable to Air Products' purchase
of the Ashland division. The court's goal is ultimately expectation,8 6 and Hone-
ywell can hardly argue that, had Air Products not breached, Honeywell would
have gained all the Ashland sales. This conclusion comes from the Code itself,
which uses as benchmarks stated estimates or, in their absence, normal or com-
parable prior requirements.8 7 The mystery is why the court used common-law
83. See 858 A.2d at 396-405, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 543-54.
84. Id. at 421-22, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 557-58, 560.
85. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this portion of the decision, although it lengthened the
time period for which Air Products was liable from two years (the length required for notification of
termination) to the end of the original contract period. See 872 A.2d at 958.
86. See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2001); see also U.C.C. § 1-106 (2000).
87. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2001).
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consequential damages cases to guide its discussion of direct damages. Its defense
for doing so was that an earlier case used them in computing a buyer's damages
under section 2-713, which the court stated was the counterpart to section 2-
708(2).88 However, section 2-713 is analogous to section 2-708(1), not to section
2-708(2). Moreover, the case the Honeywell court relied upon dealt with a claim
for consequential damages.8 9 Buyers get consequential damages under Article 2;
sellers do not.90 The Code is sufficiently clear in its treatment of direct damages
that the court should not have strained to import marginally relevant common-
law decisions that yield the same result.
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
The main issue raised this year on limitations on liability is how the subsections
of the statute fit together. Section 2-719(2) provides that if a limited remedy fails
of its essential purpose, the default remedies apply Section 2-719(3) provides that
consequential damages limitations are valid unless unconscionable. If an agree-
ment contains both a limitation on remedies and a disclaimer of consequential
damages, and the limited remedy then fails of its essential purpose, what happens
to the disclaimer of consequential damages? Is it invalidated, with the result that
the contract reverts to Code's default rule, which allows a buyer to recover con-
sequential damages that are foreseeable and not reasonably preventable? 91 Is it left
intact, subject to an unconscionability test? Or is some intermediate test used,
sometimes invalidating it, sometimes not?
Courts have split on this issue, generally favoring the second approach. In Piper
Jaffray & Co. v. SunGard Systems International, Inc. ,92 SunGard supplied computer
software to Piper Jaffray for use in securities trading. The software license agree-
ment limited SunGard's liability to the amount of the license fees and contained
a separate exclusion of consequential damages. The software never worked as
promised, despite extensions of time and many attempts at repair. Piper Jaffray
sued for breach of contract and SunGard moved to dismiss based on the liability
limitations .93
The court assumed, for the purposes of the motion, that Article 2 governed,
that the limitation of liability clause was exclusive, and that the clause failed of
its essential purpose. Nevertheless, it held that Piper Jaffray's claims for conse-
quential damages were barred by the independent disclaimer. In doing so, it
treated subsections (2) and (3) of section 2-719 as independent for four reasons.
First, it observed that the subsections apply different standards, suggesting that
88. Honeywell, 858 A.2d at 423 n.108, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 560 n.108.
89. See Canusa Corp. v. A & R Lobosco, Inc., 986 F Supp. 723, 731-33, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (West) 73, 84-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
90. Compare U.C.C. § 2-710 (2001) with U.C.C. § 2-715 (2001); see also U.C.C. § 1-305(a)(2001)
(authorizing an award of consequential damages only in cases where the Code expressly provides for
it); U.C.C. § 1-106 (2000) (same).
91. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2001).
92. 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1088 (D. Minn. 2004) (applying Pennsylvania law).
93. See id. at 1089-91.
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they must behave independently Second, it stated that reading the clauses as
interdependent would render section 2-719(3) meaningless, deleting a conse-
quential damages disclaimer without regard to its conscionability Third, it pointed
to comments one and three, which it thought were consistent with allowing the
parties to allocate unknown risks freely, so long as they did not do so unconscion-
ably Finally, it found this holding consistent with the trend in the case law and
the opinions of learned commentators. 94 Once it concluded that the clauses were
independent, the court readily upheld the waiver of consequential damages be-
cause Piper Jaffray did not claim that the waiver was unconscionable, the parties
were sophisticated firms, it would be difficult to find a lack of meaningful choice
or manifest oppression, and the parties negotiated the terms of the agreement. 95
The result in the case was not peculiar. When sophisticated parties contract in
the face of a clear risk of consequential damages, courts should honor their risk
allocations in the absence of fraud or the like. Still, one may applaud the result
and deprecate the method. Just because the subsections use different standards
does not mean they must be independent; it merely means that a limitation of
only consequential damages may properly be treated differently than a limitation
of other sorts of damages. In addition, one may ask whether reading the clauses
as independent truly gives effect to the parties' intent. A buyer's willingness to
give up consequential damages may be linked to the seller's willingness to repair
defective goods within a reasonable time, so the seller should not be able to avoid
its own duties and still insist on the liability limitation. 96 Nor does a close reading
of the text inexorably lead to independence; after all, section 2-719(2) and com-
ment 1 do state that the default remedies apply when a limited remedy fails of
its essential purpose, and neither states that this is subject to subsection (3).
An intermediate method may be more appropriate. Many courts-indeed, a
line that, according to one treatise, is "gaining momentum" 97-- employ case-by-
case analysis to determine how the parties intended to allocate the risk of con-
sequential damages when the exclusive remedy has failed of its essential purpose.
These courts look at such factors as bargaining power, the extent to which the
seller attempted in good faith to carry out the remedy, the complexity of the goods,
and the language of the agreement. 98 Indeed, one could make still finer distinc-
tions between consequential damages caused by the breach of warranty, which
94. See id. at 1095-97 (citing 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 12.10(c), at 666-68 (4th ed. 1995)).
95. PiperJaffray, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 1098.
96. See, e.g., Clark v. Int'l Harvester Co., 581 P2d 784, 800-02, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
91, 111-12 (Idaho 1978); Kelynack v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 394 N.W2d 17, 21-22, 2 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 166, 171 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
97. GREGORY M. TRAVALIO ET AL., NORDSTROM ON SALES & LEASES OF GOODS § 4.081D] [1], at 489
(2d ed. 2000).
98. See, e.g., Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 E2d 1309, 1315, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1298, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying Washington law); AES Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Co-
herent Radiation, 583 F2d 933, 941, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 861, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1978)
(applying identical provisions of California's and Illinois's U.C.C.); Ritchie Enters. v. Honeywell Bull,
Inc., 730 F Supp. 1041, 1049-50, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1170, 1181 (D. Kan. 1990)
(applying Massachusetts law).
HeinOnline -- 60 Bus. Law 1653 2004-2005
1654 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 60, August 2005
might plausibly be barred, and those caused by the failure to remedy, which might
not.99 Both methods come closer to giving effect to the parties' intent than either
the independent or interdependent approaches.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Tolling cases dominated limitations litigation this yea.' 00 Jones v. Ford Motor
Co. '0 applied the Article 2 four-year statute of limitations 0 2 to a Magnuson-Moss
action arising from the sale of a motor home. The sales contract required Jones
to submit any dispute to a Dispute Settlement Board before going to court. Jones
did, and his request for arbitration was denied six days later. Jones then filed suit.
The trial court granted Ford's motion for summary judgment. In affirming that
ruling, the appellate court followed the overwhelming body of case law by ap-
plying the Article 2 statute of limitations to a Magnuson-Moss claim. 0 3 It then
concluded that Jones's action was untimely Although Jones argued that the lim-
itations period was tolled during the mandatory arbitration, an argument to which
the court seemed sympathetic, the court pointed out that Jones had provided no
evidence that he initiated the arbitration before the limitations period had expired.
In dictum, it added that, had Jones done so, then equitable tolling should apply;
but, in any case, the tolling period was shorter than the lateness of Jones's com-
plaint, so the result would have been the same.'0
The dictum seems sound. As the court pointed out, "[t] o find otherwise would
place plaintiff in a 'Catch 22' position whereby he would face either rejection of
his claim in the trial court for having failed to comply with the terms of the
warranty or expiration of the four-year statute of limitations while he awaited a
decision from the DSB."' 0 5 Moreover, that might encourage overhasty resort to
formal dispute resolution, rather than the informal methods that should be en-
couraged. 0 6 A simple alternative is to suspend the limitations period when the
99. See, e.g., Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 E2d 587, 591-92, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 1553, 1557-61 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying South Carolina law); Bishop Logging Co. v. John
Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 455 S.E.2d 183, 191-93, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 190, 198-
200 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); TRAVALIO ET AL., supra note 97, § 4.08[D][11, at 490.100. The year provided the usual collection of routine cases as well. See, e.g., Auto Chlor Sys. of
Minn., Inc. v. JohnsonDiversey, 328 F Supp. 2d 980, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 443 (D. Minn.
2004) (applying Tennessee law) (no tolling of statute without fraudulent concealment); Meron v. Ward
Lumber Co., 779 N.Y.S.2d 597, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (warranty
that shingles will last for twenty years falls within the discovery rule of U.C.C. § 2-725(2)).
101. 807 N.E.2d 520, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 255 (I1. Ct. App. 2004).
102. See U.C.C. § 2-725 (2001).
103. See, e.g., Murungi v. Mercedes Benz Credit Corp., 192 E Supp. 2d 71, 79-80 (WD.N.Y. 2001);
Poli v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 793 A.2d 104, 111, 47 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 260, 269-70 (Nj.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
104. See Jones, 807 N.E.2d at 523, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 258.
105. Id. at 523, 53 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 258.
106. Indeed, one could generalize this to allow tolling during all attempts to resolve disputes
informally By doing so, courts could avoid prematurely ending informal dispute resolution, or, alter-
natively, depriving a buyer of an otherwise meritorious claim. Some states provide for this by statute,
and Llewellyn suggested as much in a draft of the Code. See Larry T. Garvin, Uncertainty and Error in
the Law of Sales: The Article Two Statute of Limitations, 83 B.U. L. REv. 345, 393 n.217, 398 n.240
(2003).
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contract provides for mandatory arbitration, requiring that the buyer pursue its
claim early enough to allow for an arbitral decision and the seller's response,
should the arbitration be non-binding.
0 7
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners Limited Partnership,10
PPG sold over 12,000 windows for use in a 46-story skyscraper completed in
April 1978. By July 1982, many of the windows were discolored and fogged. PPG
replaced a quarter of the windows under the warranty, a project that took over
two years. The building was sold as is in December 1989. The windows continued
to fail, and in 1994 the new owner sued PPG.
PPG asserted a limitations defense to the breach of warranty claim. The war-
ranty provided that the windows would be free from defect for five years from
April 1, 1978, and that PPG would repair or replace the defective windows upon
notice. The court held that the warranty claim was time-barred. Because the war-
ranty explicitly guaranteed future performance, limitations did not start to run
until the buyer was or should have been aware of a problem and that the problem
was not isolated. The court concluded that "the problems here were not isolated,
and 3,000 defective windows is not a few.''09
For four reasons, the court also rejected the argument that PPG's attempts to
repair the windows between 1982 and 1989 tolled the statute of limitations. First,
Texas courts had held for almost a century that repair attempts do not toll a
statute of limitations, and the courts of most other states had held the same.
Second, tolling limitations during repair attempts would render a warranty period
perpetual, making sellers reluctant to attempt any repairs. Third, faulty repairs
are actionable under either an implied warranty for repair services or the state
statute on unfair and deceptive acts and practices. Fourth, the plaintiff had not
argued breach of a repair warranty If it had, such a claim would fall outside the
U.C.C. because repair promises are services, not sales of goods, and would accrue
not when the goods were sold, but upon the failure to repair." 0
Most of these arguments are less than compelling, particularly if one seeks to
export them. The court correctly pointed out that the bulk of reported opinions
support its holding, but bulk and weight are not synonyms. Its argument that
repair tolling will reduce repair is odd. If a seller refuses to repair goods under
warranty, it will breach its contract and be liable for damages in a costly legal
action. Surely that, rather than the threat of a somewhat extended limitations
107. Magnuson-Moss allows mandatory non-binding arbitration. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (2000). The
FTC has consistently read Magnuson-Moss to ban binding arbitration. 16 C.FR. §§ 703.2(a), 703.5(j)
(2004). Courts have, of late, split on this issue, with some ruling that the statute's mechanism for
non-binding arbitration does not foreclose binding arbitration. See, e.g., Southern Energy Homes, Inc.
v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (Ala. 2000).
108. 146 S.W3d 79, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 166 (Tex. 2004); see also Sandy Springs Toyota
v. Classic Cadillac Atlanta Corp., 604 S.E.2d 303, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 844 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004) (same approach for warranty of title).
109. See PPG Industries, 146 S.W3d at 94, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 173.
110. See id. at 95-96 nn.81-83, 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) at 174 nn.81-83 (collecting cases).
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period, will drive its actions-not to mention its desire to maintain good relations
with its customers."' If anything, not tolling the statute would impede dispute
resolution, because the buyer would be impelled to sue in order to protect its
rights even while repairs went on." 2 Nor would a warranty become perpetual, as
repeated failures to repair goods should and do yield breach under both the
U.C.C. and consumer protection statutes. 113 The alternative causes of action that
the court dangled in front of the plaintiff are only sporadically available; indeed,
few if any UDAP statutes have the breadth of Texas's, and would not normally
apply to the sale of windows in an office building." 4 The final argument is the
most successful, suitably adapted. The court is surely not correct to say that a
repair promise falls outside Article 2, at least when it arises as part of a sale of
goods in a predominant purpose jurisdiction.' 1 5 However, remedial promises,
though within Article 2, are still distinct from warranties. The better-reasoned line
of authority holds that remedial promises are breached when the seller does not
honor its obligation to repair." 6 Here, there was both a warranty of quality and a
remedial promise, and the plaintiffs should have pleaded breaches of each. When
the seller supplies only a warranty, though, this argument does not apply, and
repair tolling should be available.1 7
ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
The economic loss rule typically operates to bar tort actions in cases based on
a contractual relationship unless there is personal injury or damage to property
111. The court might have argued instead that repair tolling might limit the length of a warranty,
should a seller wish to reduce the duration of its warranty exposure. This would at least be correct,
but the effect would be to make the nominal warranty period more realistic rather than to do any
harm to the buyer.
112. See, e.g., Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 55 P3d 235, 240,47 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1065, 1069 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
113. See, e.g., Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 148-49, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 899, 906 (Conn. 1976); Guerdon Indus., Inc. v.. Gentry, 531 So. 2d 1202, 1208, 7 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 67, 75 (Miss. 1988).
114. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 2002) (defining "consumer" to include
corporations with assets of up to $25 million). See generally JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER,
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 2.1.8 (5th ed. 2001). Even Texas's broad statute, contrary
to the court's suggestion, would not cover this action. It requires that the putative defendant knowingly
have made false or misleading statements of fact concerning the need for repair or have represented
that work was done that had not been done. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(13), (22)
(Vernon 2002), amended by 2005 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 728, § 11.101 (H.B. 2018) (Vernon). Neither
was the case here; the windows needed repairing, and PPG never represented that they did not or
that it had fully repaired them. In addition, this dispute exceeds the amount covered by the Texas
statute. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(g) (Vernon 2002).
115. Texas follows the predominant purpose test. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W2d 392, 394,
35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342, 345 (Tex. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Melody Home
Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
116. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Imo Indus., Inc., 6 E3d 876, 890, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 205, 219-21 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying New York law); Versico, Inc. v. Engineered
Fabrics Corp., 520 S.E.2d 505, 509-10, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1112, 1114 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999); 4B LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE'S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725:101
(3d ed. 2001). This result is preserved in revised Article 2. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2)(c) (2003).
117. This reasoning is more fully developed in Garvin, supra note 106, at 377-81.
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other than the property that is the subject of the contract." 8 Courts decided
several cases involving the economic loss rule in 2004.
With respect to raising the economic loss rule as a defense in a tort action, the
court in Kalmes Farms, Inc. v. J-Star Industries, Inc. " 9 held that a pleading stating
"the damages Plaintiff may recover are limited and controlled by the provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code" was sufficient. 120 Further, the court held that
Minnesota's statute governing the economic loss rule, which does not bar tort
actions "based upon fraud or fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation," did
not bar an action based on negligent misrepresentation.' 2'
In Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. ,122 the plaintiff purchased sprag clutches,
a safety component of helicopters that allows the rotor to continue turning after
a loss in power, from the defendant seller. The clutches had to be manufactured
to a specific level of hardness to avoid problems but the seller changed the hard-
ness level for a time without notifying the buyer. Nevertheless, the seller continued
to represent that the clutches complied with the hardness specifications. The non-
conforming clutches failed at a higher rate than the conforming clutches, although
the failures did not cause any personal injury or damage to other property The
buyer spent about $1.5 million to recall and replace the non-conforming clutches.
A jury awarded the buyer approximately $7.5 million in damages, including $6
million in punitive damages based on a finding that the seller had made false
representations of fact and had knowingly misrepresented or concealed material
facts with the intent to defraud. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed
in part, upholding the damages for breach of contract and breach of warranty, but
reversing the judgment based on the misrepresentation claim because of the eco-
nomic loss rule.
The California Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the claims for fraud and
misrepresentation were tort claims, independent of the contract, and therefore
not barred by the economic loss rule.123 Specifically, the court held that the seller's
provision of false certificates of compliance was independent tortious conduct. 24
The court then noted that public policy requires the imposition of tort remedies
in situations in which the actions that amount to breach of contract also violate
social policies. 12 5 One justice dissented, arguing that the existence of an indepen-
dent tort was not enough to evade the economic loss rule. 126
One high-profile 2004 case involved the economic loss doctrine in a somewhat
unusual setting. In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,2' the Illinois Supreme
118. See, e.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324,327 (Il. 1982); Suffolk Cty v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 728 E2d 52 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying New York law).
119. 52 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 845 (D. Minn. 2004).
120. See id. at 849.
121. See id. at 852 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604. 10(e)).
122. 102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004).
123. Id. at 268.
124. Id. at 274.
125. Id. at 275.
126. Id. at 276 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
127. 821 N.E.2d 1099 (I1. 2004).
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Court considered a suit brought by the City of Chicago and Cook County against
gun manufacturers, distributors, and dealers seeking damages and injunctive relief
for public nuisance. The court refused to recognize an exception to the economic
loss rule when, as the plaintiffs contended, "defendant's conduct 'creates an un-
reasonable threat to public health, safety, and welfare.'" 2 Thus, because the plain-
tiffs alleged no personal injury or harm to property, the court held their claim
barred by the economic loss rule.
129
In Inter Impex S.A.E. v. Comtrade Corp., discussed above, 30 the court recognized
New York's exception to the economic loss rule when there is an allegation of
negligent performance of a contract. The plaintiff, a purchaser of dried milk,
argued that the milk had been improperly and negligently packaged, causing
economic loss. In dismissing the negligence claim, the court noted that, although
New York has a negligent performance exception to the economic loss rule, the
exception applies only to contracts for the provision of services, not to contracts
for the provision of goods.' 3' Further, the court noted that the negligent perfor-
mance exception requires a duty independent of the contract, and that no such
duty was alleged in the case before it.
132
128. Id. at 1141.
129. Id. at 1142.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
131. Inter Impex S.A.E., No. 00 Civ. 0133 (GBD), 2004 WL 2793213, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2004).
132. Id.
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